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Choice is central to developments in many areas of welfare. Making choices, for example
about health, social care, employment and housing, can be very emotional. This article
draws on theories from experimental psychology and behavioural economics to analyse
empirical evidence from a longitudinal, qualitative study of support-related choices. It
argues that if people are expected to make emotion-laden choices, and to minimise
negative aspects associated with the process of making a choice, they need to be
supported in doing so. It contributes to the limited evidence and debate to date about
the process costs to individuals of choice.
Keywords: Choice, decision-making, disabled people, emotions.
I n t roduct ion
Choice is a key concept in welfare reform, particularly in England but also elsewhere
in Europe (Lundsgaard, 2005; Greve, 2009). It has been the subject of much academic
debate, including a themed section on ‘Choice or Voice?’ concentrating on the UK in
this journal (Social Policy and Society, 2008), and a special issue of Social Policy and
Administration (2009) which extended the debate Europe-wide and to diverse sectors
such as education, care and pensions. However, few papers have considered how people
experience the practical implications of choice policies, and, in particular, how emotions
and choices are related; this article goes some way to redressing this balance by exploring
the emotions that disabled and older people experience in making choices about welfare-
related services in England.
Choice policies are underpinned by the empowerment discourse of the disability
movement (see Morris, 2006; Ellis, 2007) and by discourses of consumerism and quasi-
markets (see Glendinning, 2008). It is not the role of this article to rehearse the arguments
for and against choice policies or give detailed accounts of how these policies have been
implemented. It is sufficient to note that there has been a general policy shift towards
enabling people to exercise choice and have more responsibility for and control over the
care and support they receive across a range of services. The Labour government from
the late 1990s promoted activation, empowerment and ‘responsibilities as well as rights’
(Clarke, 2005); the current Coalition Government is continuing with this policy direction.
Thus, recent welfare reforms in England have resulted in the transfer of responsibility
for managing choices about welfare services from third party, trained professionals to
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service users and patients. This transfer is placing new emotional demands on recipients
of services. Clarke et al. (2006) have referred to this as the devolution of stress. So
what are the emotional consequences of this shift in responsibility? How does managing
these emotions impact on the process of making a choice and overall welfare gains? Do
individuals need to expend more time and energy managing not just the choices that have
been devolved to them but also the associated emotions?
Appleby et al. (2003) claim it is difficult to argue against the desirability of allowing
people more say in decisions that affect them. However, there are concerns over the
uncritical acceptance of ‘individualization, responsibilization and the transfer of risk
from the state to the individual’ (Ferguson, 2007: 387). Although too much choice can
be confusing (Schwartz, 2004), and being responsible for making choices can be stressful
(Barnett et al., 2008), in general the role of emotions and choices in analyses of welfare
state reforms across Europe has been neglected (Greve, 2009). Thus, as policies result in
increasing numbers of people becoming actively involved in choices relating, amongst
other things, to their health and social well-being, it is timely to explore the relationship
between emotions and choice-making.
This article explores these issues for disabled working age and older people making
choices about health, social care, housing and employment. It does so by using well-
developed theories of decision-making, from experimental psychology and behavioural
economics, as a framework to explore the types and causes of emotions experienced
during choice-making. Although other frameworks could have been chosen, the focus
of these robust but nuanced theories was felt to offer the greatest potential for insights
into the processes of decision-making in relation specifically to both the causes and
impacts of emotions. Choices are defined broadly to reflect the special circumstances
and relational nature of choices in public services (Clarke et al., 2008). Therefore, we
include not only experiences of choices between two or more available options but also
deciding for or against an action, and emotional experiences when waiting for opinions
from professionals about eligibility for or the availability of desired options.
Theor ies o f emot ions and cho ice-mak ing
This section draws on a review of the dynamics of decision-making undertaken in
preparation for the study on which this article is based (see Beresford and Sloper, 2008).
Emotions can limit people’s ability to make choices; negative emotions such as stress
or fear, in particular, can affect people’s usual abilities through limiting their cognitive
capacity (Lemerise and Arsenio, 2000). This limitation, ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon,
1955), occurs if people are unable to cope with all the information at their disposal. In
effect, they reach the bounds of their ability to think rationally. These boundaries are
different for different people, but for each individual they can also differ over time and by
circumstance.
Emotions can also result in people avoiding making choices. Theories of emotion-
focused coping argue that individuals cope with negative emotions by minimising the
emotional aspect of choices, that is, by avoiding the unwanted emotions (Folkman and
Lazarus, 1988). This can be achieved by reducing the amount of thought devoted to
the choice – avoiding it altogether, delaying it or showing a preference for the status
quo. In some cases, people might prefer someone else to make the decision for them.
Alternatively, the specific emotional aspects of the choice might be singled out and
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avoided by concentrating on other important but less emotional factors (Beresford and
Sloper, 2008).
The anticipation of emotions (especially regret) can also lead to avoidance or delays
in making choices. Anticipated regret may be over the outcome of a choice as well as the
process used to make a decision (Connolly and Reb, 2005). Delays can seem appropriate
in the short term but be outweighed by longer term costs (Beattie et al., 1994). Aversion
to regret can lead to excessive gathering of information if that information is expected to
reduce the potential for uncertainty. However, excessive information-gathering may lead
to an inability to process all the information and thus incur problems associated with
bounded rationality.
People may also avoid choices because they fear potential negative outcomes more
than they value potential gains. This is known as being ‘risk averse to losses’, and means
people make more effort to avoid a loss than to make an equivalent gain (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1984). People also prefer the status quo, the certainty of their current situation,
rather than the risk of a loss. Importantly, an individual’s attitude to risk depends on their
relative wealth (Allingham, 2002). It follows that an individual’s emotional response to
choice-related risk will depend on the size of the potential loss relative to their current
status. This might be pertinent particularly when loss is measured in health status or
quality of life.
Other theories and evidence paint a more positive picture. The theory of problem-
focused coping (Folkman and Lazarus, 1988) argues that people use negative emotions
to indicate the importance of a choice. Generally, people make more effort to resolve
decisions they consider important than ones they consider less important; Tiedens and
Linton (2001) argue similarly that negative emotions can result in more systematic
processing of choices. Furthermore, emotions may result in people simplifying complex,
multifaceted decisions by using heuristics (rules of thumb); cognitive effort is saved
by processing only the most important information. One type of heuristic is the
‘lexicographic’ rule in which only the most important attributes of each option are
considered (Bettman, 1979). In essence, these theories argue that negative emotions
can have positive effects on choice-making.
This overview raises a number of specific research questions for exploration. Is
people’s cognitive functioning impaired by their emotional state and does this lead to
the use of heuristics? Do people avoid negative emotional aspects of choice-making or
do they embrace their feelings and try harder to reach the best solution? How do people
respond to making choices where they risk suffering losses or feeling regret? And what
are the wider implications for policies that prioritise choice by welfare service users?
Methods and sample
This article draws on the accounts of fifty-two disabled people (working age and older)
who took part in a qualitative, longitudinal study exploring choice-making in the context
of changing circumstances. Multi-centre research ethics approval was obtained.
Participants were recruited from a wide range of organisations in England, including:
condition-specific voluntary organisations, hospitals, local authority social service
departments, community groups, an independent recruitment agency and ‘snowballing’
from other study participants. Participants were selected purposively to include people
with support needs that were progressive but fluctuating, meaning that additional services
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Table 1 Characteristics of study sample
People with fluctuating
needs (n = 30)
People with the sudden
onset of needs (n = 22)
Age
Working age – under
65 years
20 13





White British 25 20
Other ethnic group 5 2
Location of home
Sub/urban location 20 20
Rural location 10 2
Living arrangements




Lives alone 8 4
Number of people interviewed
Round 1 30 22
Round 2 26 13
Round 3 20 11
might be needed on a temporary basis; and those with the sudden onset of support
needs resulting from an accident or sudden deterioration in health. The aim was to
include people accustomed to making welfare-related choices and those making them
for the first time. Although a pre-defined sampling quota aimed to ensure diversity in age,
gender, ethnicity and living arrangements, the majority of participants were working age
white British females (see Table 1). One participant with limited speech was interviewed
using ‘Talking Mats’ (Murphy et al., 2005), a visual framework using symbols; two were
interviewed through interpreters.
Each participant was interviewed up to three times in 2007–10. In the first two
interviews, participants discussed in detail a recent important choice they had made
about services or support, including the options and information available, the roles of
other people in making the choice and the outcomes of the choice. In the second and
third interviews, participants discussed ongoing or new choices, but also reflected back
on choices discussed in earlier interviews. This article is based on data from all three
interviews. A wide range of choices was discussed, including choices about health care
treatments; social care, such as help at home and direct payments (cash budgets to pay
for care); minor and major housing adaptations; and support for employment.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. The research team focused initial
analysis around the main topics discussed in the interviews (such as information,
relationships, options and outcomes), but also read subsamples of transcripts to identify
other emergent themes and agree a framework for analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
All transcripts were read and coded using the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis
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software MAXQDA. Coded data were then summarised in a series of charts, following the
Framework approach (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994), addressing issues relevant to individual
rounds of interviews and themes across different rounds. This method of displaying the
data aided identification of more/less common issues, within and across themes and
participants. Many issues were explored in different strands of the study; here we report
just those findings relating to the emotional dimensions of choice.
F ind ings
E m o t i o n s a n d th e i r c a u s e s
All participants experienced emotions in the course of making choices. Most of the
emotions discussed were negative, such as fear, worry, stress, isolation and anger. To a
lesser extent, participants reported positive emotions, for example excitement or hope.
However, not only were the majority of emotions negative, but negative emotions were
expressed more strongly than positive ones.
One cause of negative emotions was decreased mental and physical well-being.
People reported a downward spiral whereby their perceived difficulty in making decisions
led to anxiety and further deteriorations in health. Feelings were complex and intense:
Stressed and worried. I mean, I described myself as desperate at that time, and I think that was
very much influenced by my, what was probably six weeks of being ill every day by that time,
it has an impact on the way you see things. (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID105)
I am noticeably physically . . . weaker and that’s affecting me, and stresses in the house and that
sort of thing, and I just . . . I just, I can’t, I just can’t deal with it. (Man with fluctuating needs,
ID111)
I had some bad nightmares and I had, you know, and of course this is complicated by pain,
loss of function, fears about the future, fears about my career . . . So there were a lot of layers
of feelings. (Woman with sudden onset of needs, ID125)
Uncertainty, or as one woman put it, ‘fear of the unknown’, played a major role in
creating negative and especially stress-related emotions:
I would have been relieved if they’d said . . . you can’t have it or you can have it, because the
not knowing, the sort of hanging in limbo was, it was an awful [experience]. (Woman with
fluctuating needs, ID131)
It were a bit scary because I didn’t know what, and up to the, seeing me, the main bloke and
telling me what were wrong, nobody had actually telled me . . . there were no information.
(Older woman with fluctuating needs, ID203)
That six week period, direct payments, with all these women coming in and that booklet sat
in there, thinking oh my God, I hated that period because it was stressful because I didn’t
understand it. (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID107)
Fear of losing control, for example over daily routines when considering applying for
home care or returning home after an extended hospital stay, preyed heavily on people’s
minds. People also feared losing positive features from their lives, such as current support
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or periods of stable health; this is consistent with the theory that people are risk averse
to losses. For example, a former art teacher, unable to work due to fluctuating mobility
problems, was too scared to approach the job centre for advice as she feared they would
force her to take an inappropriate job which would have adverse effects on both her
health and finances.
Sudden changes in health or social circumstances that were outside people’s control
but necessitated quick responses were especially stressful. External factors could also
generate unexpected choices within tight deadlines, as illustrated by a man with complex
care needs who was forced into a difficult and unwanted choice about a different drug
regime when manufacturers suddenly ended production of his regular medication. Stress
was also experienced when people’s health deteriorated slowly but they delayed asking
for help for as long as possible, until the need for support became urgent. One reason
for such delays was people’s reluctance to accept their increased support needs, in some
cases resulting in anger:
It was stressful . . . making that choice. I think . . . knowing that you have to, you do need
support. I think it’s owning up to yourself that, you know, you need help, because I try to be as
independent as possible. (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID113)
Nobody helps, nobody explains, nobody helps you cope with the fact you’re a different person
now, and you’re angry because you’ve been made into a different person. (Woman with sudden
onset of needs, ID125)
I was so angry with myself, so angry with everything at the time, you know, I was really flippant
about the choices I had really, you know. I think the, the stage I was at, it’s not just a, it’s not
just anger, it’s, I was ashamed as well, it wasn’t even a, you know, a proper accident. (Man with
sudden onset of needs, ID126)
These examples show how sudden or urgent changes in circumstances, not just the
sudden onset of illness, can cause negative emotions.
Equally, the absence of deadlines for making choices caused stress, particularly
for people with fluctuating/progressive conditions when responsibility for the timing of
decisions fell on them. Acting too soon could mean jeopardising current, relatively good
health, or, if a treatment had a limited lifespan, experiencing poorer quality of life in the
future; acting too late could risk unnecessary loss of independence. This again illustrates
concern about the risk of losses.
Lack of support made people feel isolated during choice-making processes. Feelings
of isolation were caused also by conflicting advice from different sources, or receiving
advice with which participants disagreed, particularly from professionals.
It’s just that I feel very anxious . . . because there’s no . . . real, there’s nobody just mentoring or
watching, just, well, you know, apart from myself now I suppose watching to see what happens.
(Woman with fluctuating needs, ID107)
If things got worse I think there’d be more support available but when you’re in between,
between like being really healthy, middle of the road and then sick, there’s no support in, in
the middle there from, from anywhere. (Man with sudden onset of needs, ID121)
But, you know, I got no, no support, no advice from . . . occupational therapy and . . . I actually
sort of like partly got the feeling that . . . the individual occupational therapist was not (pause)
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not in agreement with me having the adaptations done at all. That she, for whatever reason,
I don’t know, had made a personal judgement that she didn’t think I was worthy. (Man with
fluctuating needs, ID111)
In addition, people worried about failing to identify all acceptable options when
making a choice, that is they anticipated regret.
Anxious I would say, that springs to mind . . . Am I doing the right thing? (Pause) Is there any,
always thinking in the back of my mind, is there something I’ve missed . . . before I’ve elected
to do this? (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID112)
Stressed and worried . . . Well you think, well it was, I’d decided I wanted it doing but I still was
worried about it, was I doing the right thing? (Older woman with fluctuating needs, ID205)
Anticipated regret was evident especially among people who felt they had ‘stumbled
upon’ information about choices, or those who found available information more limited
than they would have liked. The importance and permanence of potential outcomes also
aroused anxiety, for instance sensing that a choice was irreversible or that its impact
would be long lasting.
Positive emotions were less commonly reported and were expressed less strongly
than negative ones. However, even positive emotions were frequently mixed with negative
ones, so people would describe their feelings as: ‘anxious and frustrated . . . and fearful,
positive, excited . . . hopeful, they’re all there’. Only a handful of participants felt entirely
positive about a particular choice. For them, being positive was associated with feeling
in control of the choice and expecting a better future as a result of the choice made.
People who had experienced a downturn in health as a result of a previous stressful
decision-making process consciously forced themselves to be positive in order to avoid
further deteriorations, suggesting a reaction to their earlier experiences of loss.
The impac t s o f emot i ons on cho ice -mak ing
Our findings support the theory that cognitive processing can be impaired by negative
emotions. People reported feeling drained by the experience of having to make a choice
at a time when they felt ‘overwhelmed with stress’. Although there was no evidence of the
use of heuristics, there was some reliance on instincts and some self-confessed irrational
behaviour.
I wasn’t really thinking straight at the time, I don’t know what I was thinking in fact. Was I
thinking, was I able to think? It was just instinctive. (Man with sudden onset of needs, ID130)
Anger, as well as a mix of other emotions, left people unable to think or express
themselves logically:
[It] would be useful to have somebody else to bang on the table for you, because when you’re
feeling that ill you just don’t have the strength and the energy and the willpower to, to maybe put
over a reasoned argument and of course when it’s happening to you yourself or, your emotions
are involved so it’s difficult to not be emotional about it as well . . . [I] felt too emotional about
it to be able to [act] rationally. (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID105)
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These quotes suggest that impaired thinking resulted not only from stress intrinsic
to the choice being made, but also more general negative emotions associated with
feeling ill and tired. It is notable in the quotes above that the participant with the sudden
onset of needs talked about feelings specific to the choice in hand, whereas the woman
with fluctuating needs talked about more general tiredness, not necessarily related to the
choice.
The theoretical literature also suggests that people may cope with strong negative
emotions by avoiding making a choice and thus avoiding the negative emotions associated
with it. The empirical evidence from this study supports this. Negative emotions resulted
in people feeling hesitant about making a decision, reflecting uncertainty and anticipated
regret at an unsatisfactory process or outcome. In situations where people feared a
loss, for example where they felt that their current health or level of support might be
compromised, they avoided or delayed making choices. Delaying choices also helped
people to cope with the stress associated with uncertainty about the timing of a decision;
in effect, they justified avoiding a decision by emphasising the benefits of the current
situation.
I feel OK and I don’t want to rock the boat. (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID118)
[S]ometimes the status quo, although it may not be ideal, it’s a case of you know what you’re
living with, you know what you’re dealing with. (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID105)
The point at which people stopped avoiding a choice was when the current situation
became untenable and anticipated regret lessened. This was evidenced by an older man
considering a lung transplant. For many years he had assessed the risks associated with
the operation to be too great to take. Eventually, his quality of life reduced to such a
degree that he was willing to accept these risks.
Some people were tired and stressed by their changing health conditions and could
not face making another choice. This suggests a cumulative negative effect of emotions
on subsequent decision-making for people with long-term, fluctuating conditions. These
people reacted by, as one respondent said, ‘backing off’ from the choice. This in effect
delayed decisions until the prospect of making a choice became more manageable. For
example, when she first opted to receive care at home, a mother of three rejected using
direct payments. She believed that her mental struggle to cope with her loss of mobility
and her decision to ask for external help left her unable to deal with a further choice
about how support should be delivered. Two years later her emotions were more settled:
I’ve got my head round everything else. It’s all dealt, it’s all slotted into its own place, and now
direct payments is a doddle. It just does not seem like a problem now. But then it did, and I
wouldn’t touch [it] with a bargepole because it just seemed so much work and so much time
and effort. (Woman with fluctuating needs, ID110)
In contrast, anger could result in quick decision-making, thus avoiding having to deal
with emotions for any period of time. With anger, choices were made in an offhand and
inattentive manner. A working age man explained how the ‘fog was in front of my face’
when he had to make an important career decision a few days after a serious accident:
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I can’t say it was an easy choice but I made it easy by just being flippant with it. ‘OK, not a
problem, yeah, I’ll just go, I’ll just stay here’, you know, ‘Go away, leave me alone’. (Man with
sudden onset of needs, ID126)
An alternative to avoiding negative emotions is to embrace them as an indicator of the
importance of a choice and thus heighten the choice-making process. The result is more
systematic processing than usual. This response was not widely evident in this study. One
example was an older woman who made a choice about extensive housing adaptations;
she spoke specifically about how she was encouraged to be particularly conscientious in
making the decision through a combination of fear that she might make poor choices and
her belief that she would never have to make the same choice again.
Discuss ion
This article has explored, for disabled working age and older people, the role of emotions
in making choices about health and social care, housing and employment. It has examined
both the impact of making choices on emotions and the subsequent impact of those
emotions on choice-making.
One of the strengths of this research is that it has used experimental theories
from psychology and behavioural economics to understand empirical evidence on
welfare service-related choices. Using these theories as an analytic framework facilitated
exploration of the impact of emotions on decision-making. The choices discussed were
those considered most important by the participants themselves. Whilst this created a
wide range of choices, including routine as well as major choices in health, social care,
housing and employment support, it also left some gaps, such as decisions about moving
into sheltered accommodation or residential care, which did not arise in the course of the
study. However, the common causes and impacts of emotions across this diverse range
of choices suggest the findings are robust.
This article has some limitations. It has not addressed how emotions associated with
the process of making choices affect satisfaction with the outcome of choice; outcomes
have been explored in other articles from this study (Maddison and Beresford, 2012;
Rabiee, 2012). However, even if people are satisfied with the outcomes of their choices,
they are likely to have experienced emotional highs and lows in order to get to that point.
Thus, although the end result might be positive, if the decision-making process comprised
fewer negative emotions, the overall experience may be improved. Furthermore,
despite efforts to recruit a diverse study sample, there were insufficient older people or
people from ethnic minority groups to be able to make robust statements about differences
in the experiences of these groups. However, the findings do suggest that the decision
to include in the study people who have experienced the sudden onset of an illness
and are thus relatively new to making choices and those with longer-term fluctuating
conditions who have been making choices for many years, was justified. Among the latter
there appeared to be a distinctive cumulative effect of general tiredness as well as fatigue
with making choices, combined with concerns about loss of health and support, which
resulted in a marked reluctance to make choices.
The findings provide no evidence that people used heuristics to aid decision-making,
although there was evidence of impaired cognitive functioning. There was little evidence
of a relationship between health status and attitude to risk. Fear of loss or regret at the
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outcome of a choice, and uncertainty associated with the timing of choices, however, did
result in hesitation and avoidance of choice-making; this is consistent with the literature.
This finding is strengthened by a lack of evidence that people treated negative emotions as
an indicator of the importance of a choice, as the alternative theory of problem-focused
coping would suggest. The implication, that people who feel negative whilst making
welfare-related decisions tend towards avoiding rather than embracing these decisions, is
important, especially within the context of policies that assume choice is beneficial per
se and that opportunities for choice should be maximised.
The findings illustrate the extent to which welfare state reforms can cause significant
emotional costs in people’s personal lives. That is not to say that the costs outweigh the
benefits of greater choice, control and engagement in the process of making choices,
rather that the emotional costs involved in making choices should not be overlooked.
It is interesting that there were instances where people felt uncomfortable with the
choices they were making but where time helped them to adjust to their new situations
and thus re-engage with choices. However, there were also examples of people who felt
overwhelmed by the choices they had to make, which resulted in disengagement. What
this suggests is that the trajectory of people’s physical and mental health, including any
fluctuations, can affect their ability to deal with the emotions associated with making
choices. These fluctuating emotions are not solely related directly to the choice being
undertaken, but to well-being more generally. It follows that in some cases, and at some
times, people might prefer to enjoy the outcomes of their choices without being wholly
responsible for producing those choices; as Hochschild (2005: 84) says, ‘the meaning or
fun is not in the growing of a vegetable garden but in the eating from it’.
The findings also suggest that people perceived themselves at times to have poor
decision-making ability, that is bounded rationality. This arose both from negative
emotions related specifically to making decisions about (and for) themselves and from
negative emotions related more generally to life’s ‘ups and downs’. The fact that people
felt, in some circumstances, that they were not good at making choices may reflect beliefs
about how they think they are expected to make choices – in a rational and emotionless
manner. While psychological research, in particular, refutes theories of simplistic rational
decision-making, and although people are acting in line with more nuanced models, it
may be that they would benefit from reassurance that making choices is complex and
emotional.
One important policy implication is that disabled and older people making choices
about a range of welfare services would, in the main, benefit from continued or greater
support from professionals. This is not an argument against devolving responsibilities, but
for empowering people by offering appropriate support in all aspects of making choices.
This support may come from social workers (Hudson, 2009), other professionals or expert
peers (Department of Health, 2001; Coulter et al., 2005; Squire and Hill, 2006) or from
personal networks (Baxter and Glendinning, 2011). The nature of professional support is
changing, but that support is still vital, especially in helping people deal with emotions
and time pressures that can result in making quick but rash decisions or in delaying
decisions, both of which might later be regretted.
In returning to the broader policy goals of increasing opportunities for welfare-related
choices, while there are undoubtedly benefits from devolving greater responsibilities to
individuals, this research has drawn attention to the associated emotional costs. These
costs arise both directly from the negative emotions experienced during the choice-making
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process, and indirectly from the effects of these emotions on decisions, such as avoidance
of or delays in making choices. The findings further our understanding of the relationships
between the potential benefits and costs of choice, particularly the emotional costs to
individuals of the process of choice-making.
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